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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of privacy and the legal rights it implicates have
historically proved difficult to define. In 1888, an English judge named
Cooley coined one of the broadest yet most commonly used phrases to
describe the right to privacy. He called it "the right to be let alone." 1
* Candidate for J.D., Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1998.
B.A. with honors, Florida Atlantic University, 1995.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed.
1984).
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France has adopted a similarly broad definition by which privacy is the
"antithesis of everything that is public: hence everything concerning an
individual's home, family, religion, health, sexuality, personal legal, and
personal financial affairs" is private.2 In the United States, the United
States Supreme Court found a right to privacy to exist in a penumbra
which emanated from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
3
The right to make intimate decisions regarding contraceptives 4 and the
right choose whether to have an abortion5 have both been held to be
aspects of the right to privacy. Though seemingly quite diverse, each of
these elements does have something in common. They protect autonomy,
liberty and human dignity. Justice Douglas captured this idea when he
stated that one aspect of privacy is "the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and
personality. "
6
This article will concentrate on the aspect of the right to privacy
Alan Westin defined as "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others." 7 The press often usurps that authority
when, for example, it publishes personal information about public figures.
Specifically, I will address the question whether there is or should be
privacy protection from the kind of personally invasive publications
commonly found in tabloids, and from the often invasive newsgathering
techniques employed to gain access to the information published. In
particular, I will examine the absence of this kind of privacy protection in
England and explore whether International Human Rights law offers any
protection which English law does not.
Because England has no privacy law, it is helpful to look first at
American privacy law. I do this primarily for convenience, so that I may
borrow American terminology to label the kinds of privacy protections
England lacks. Beyond that, this paper is not intended as a comparison of
English and American privacy law. Next, I will demonstrate the need for
a right to privacy, especially in light of modern technology. In Section IV,
I will provide an overview of Parliament's refusal to legislatively create a
2. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS (Chairman: David
Calcutt QC 1990).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
4. Id.
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1979) (Douglas, J., concurring).
7. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
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right of privacy. This will include a discussion about the Press Complaints
Commission, the private organization whom Parliament has chosen to
defer claims of invasions of privacy by the press. In the two following
sections, I will examine the treatment of the right to privacy by the English
judiciary and by the European Court of Human Rights, and the competing
interest of freedom of the press.8 Section VII will be dedicated exclusively
to the historic Human Rights Bill now pending in Parliament. 9 The Human
Rights Bill, if passed, would incorporate the European Convention on
Human Rights into domestic law and thereby preempt the inaction of both
Parliament and the English judiciary in the area of privacy. So, before
turning to a more in-depth discussion of the right to privacy in England, I
begin now with a brief overview of the origins and subsequent
development of the right to privacy in the United States.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy has not enjoyed a long tradition in the United
States. It was not until 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
wrote their famous Harvard Law Review article, that the "right to be let
alone"10 was recognized at all. Seventy years after the Warren and
Brandeis article, William Prosser divided the right to be let alone into four
distinct torts: 1) intrusion into an individual's seclusion or into his private
affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; 3) publicity
which causes an individual to be seen in a false light; and 4) appropriation
of an individual's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage."
Most states now follow a similar scheme. As first noted by Dean
Prosser, 12 there are two primary differences between these torts. Whereas
the first requires no actual publication or intent to publish for an invasion
of privacy to be actionable, 13 the others do. This article is concerned with
8. While freedom of speech is an important concern and might better be considered
earlier, I have chosen to delay the discussion until the issue of Article 10 under the European
Convention arises because England, having no written constitution, does not possess the
equivalent of a First Amendment. Free speech rights in England derive from the common law.
9. The Human Rights Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on Oct. 23, 1997. The
text of the Bill, as yet unavailable through Her Majesty's Stationery Shop, is available at
Parliament's web-site on the Internet at (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/Idbills/038/97038-a.htm >.
10. Brandeis, supra note 1.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
12. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1979), reprinted in PHILOSPHICAL
DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 104 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed. 1984).
13. Intrusion into seclusion consists of an intentional interference with an individual's
interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of
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the right of privacy as encompassed by intrusion into seclusion (as when
the press stalks public figures from place to place) and public disclosure of
private facts (as when, for example, personal information about the lives of
public figures is published in the tabloids).
Since the Warren and Brandeis article, much has been written in an
attempt to further define the right now embodied in the United States by
various state statutes and a confusing body of case law. Despite one
hundred years of development, there is still uncertainty regarding the scope
of the right in the United States today.
14
England's development of the right to privacy has fared far worse.
Although Warren and Brandeis based many of their privacy ideas on
English cases," England does not explicitly provide a right to privacy at
all. 6  That two western nations, both of which are thought to be highly
developed in the area of human rights law, could differ so radically
regarding the notion of privacy makes one wonder whether the right to
privacy is really all that important. If England has no explicit right of
privacy, what form of regulation, if any, is there on intrusion into
seclusion, a privacy right recognized and protected as a civil tort in the
United States? Is there a similar right encompassed in international human
rights law under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
Is the right to be let alone one of those fundamental human rights that both
deserves and is afforded protection under customary international law? If
so, how broad or narrow is the international understanding of the right?
a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at §
652B cmt.a.
14. For example, the Supreme Court, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), held
that a newspaper who printed the name of a rape victim was not liable under a statute which
forbade the publication. Some suggest that this case has effectively precluded any future tort
actions involving the publication of true information, regardless of how private the information
or outrageous or embarrassing its dissemination. See Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law
Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C.L. REV.
989, 1076-78 (1995); see also Mary Ellen Hockwalt, Bad News: Privacy Ruling to Increase
Press Litigation. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 23 AKRON L. REV. 561 (1990). However, it is my
contention that because the name of the victim was a matter of public record, and therefore in the
public domain, these authors are wrong. An action could still lie for publication of similar
information not already in the public domain.
15. One such English privacy case involved an injunction awarded to Prince Albert against
the publication of pictures he had drawn of himself and Queen Victoria. Though decided on
grounds of breach of confidence, Warren and Brandeis interpreted it as an early right to privacy
case. Brandeis, supra note 1, at 83. See also Eric Barendt, End this Intrusion Now, Eric
Barendt Says It's Closing Time at the Last Chance Saloon, and the Press Needs to be Curbed
with a Law which will Punish Unwarranted Intrusion, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 24, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 2403252.
16. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The
Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1403 (1991).
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Will the death of Diana have any real impact on privacy protection in
England? It is these questions that this paper will address.
III. PRIVACY As ESSENTIAL To HUMAN DIGNITY
It has been argued by some that Warren and Brandeis gave birth to
a trivial tort.17 However, their description of the societal ills symptomatic
of a breach of the right to be let alone, astoundingly contemporary and
even prophetic for the time, belies its triviality:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery. To satisfy the prurient taste the details of
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon
column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture,
has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasion on
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."
Today, the right to privacy is more essential to the preservation of
human dignity than ever before. Technological advances far beyond the
imaginations of Warren and Brandeis have emerged which make finding
Browning's "obscure nook" virtually impossible.19 The video camera and
17. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). See also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and
the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, in
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 47 (1976).
18. Brandeis, supra note 1.
19. Referring to Robert Browning, Paracelsus, in 1 THE POEMS 118, 127 (J. Pettigrew ed.
1981) which reads:
I give the fight up: let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me.
I want to be forgotten even by God.
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telephoto lens, for example, have intruded upon our everyday lives in vast
numbers of ways. Granted, there are many privacy invasions utilizing
these technologies which are in fact quite innocent, even laudable. Video
surveillance, for example, is most often concerned with the community's
need to know about the conduct of others in order to protect society.
Banks, for example, are videotaping transactions at automated teller
machines; employers are videotaping employees in the workplace;
department stores are videotaping dressing rooms and bathrooms; parents
are video-taping nannies while they care for their children. But there are an
equal number of invasions that could be characterized as nefarious which,
without an action for invasion of privacy, will go without redress.
Since there is no law in England specifically directed at protecting
rights of privacy, plaintiffs must resort to other areas of the law for
protection. Unfortunately, the protections afforded privacy via these
alternative actions often prove inadequate. A good example is the
infamous case where a man, for his personal amusement, bugged the
bedroom of a neighbor.2° The defendant was found liable for civil trespass
and fined a mere fifty-two pounds. The size of the award demonstrates the
inability of alternative causes of action to adequately protect privacy
interests. Civil trespass is intended to protect the enjoyment of the
occupation of land.2' As to this interest, the intrusion was minimal - only
a small unobtrusive device was placed in the neighbor's bedroom. But the
intrusion on the neighbor's right to privacy was much greater. Had it been
the aim of the action to consider the neighbor's privacy interest, the
amount of damages awarded would have been proportionately higher, as
would the effectiveness of the deterrent.
To further demonstrate the ineffectiveness of alternative causes of
action to protect privacy, let us consider a hypothetical provided in a recent
law review article. "A takes his video camcorder to the beach. He records
B who is sunbathing. A's purpose if filming B is to use the videotape for
sexual gratification, which he later does."" Under alternative English
The reference is made all -the more appropriate here because this work was cited both by the
Calcutt Committee in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at ii, and also by
Krotoszynski,. supra note 16.
20. Alasdair Palmer, Someone Is Always Watching You. Britain May Soon Acquire a Law
Protecting Privacy, But Will it Help Any But the Rich and Famous - and Will it Really Stop the
Snoopers?, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2331908.
21. REPORT OFTHE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.13.
22. McClurg posed this hypothetical to demonstrate that motive should be a factor when
considering whether an invasion of privacy which occurs in a public place should be actionable in
the United States. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1076-78. I offer it here for an entirely different
purpose.
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criminal and tort remedies, B will be left unprotected all together. Briefly,
here is how the various alternative actions fail. First, there is no action for
trespass since this incident occurs at a public beach. 3 Nor is there an
action for breach of confidence because, under these circumstances, it
can't be said that A owed B a duty of confidentiality?' Finally, there is no
action for criminal harassment 2l or nuisance26 if A merely videotaped B
without incident.
Now, let's change the above scenario somewhat. Suppose A is
actually a member of the press and B is a public figure sunbathing topless
on a private beach. A's motive is to broadcast the images on the Nightly
Mirror Tabloid Television Show. The above shortcomings in the law
apply here as well, but there are a few others worth mentioning. Now that
B is on private property, trespass would seem to be implicated. However,
since trespass is directed at protecting an individual's enjoyment and
occupation of land,17 not at protecting privacy, there will be no action for
trespass unless B's enjoyment of her occupation of the land had been
directly interfered with. If in this instance, as is true in most, B took the
video from an adjacent property using a telephoto lens, B may not have
been aware of A's activity at all. Therefore, no interference could possibly
have occurred. Now, suppose B is a member of Parliament and the images
"tend to lower [her] in the estimation of right-thinking members of society
generally. "I Though, by that definition, the images may be defamatory,
no action for .defamation or libel exists because the event depicted was
true.2 9 Again, England's method of protecting privacy by bootstrapping it
onto other already existing causes of action is ineffective.3°
23. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.12.
24. Id. para. 8.1.
25. Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Order Act make it an offense to use "threatening
abusive or insulting words or behaviour", with intent to cause fear of or provoke immediate
violence or to use such words "within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused
harassment or harm." The offense may be committed on public or private property. Id. para.
6.3.
26. Id. para. 6.12.
27. Id.
28. Id. para. 7.3.
29. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 7.3, 7.9.
30. There has been much scholarly discussion regarding England's hit and miss approach
to the protection of privacy rights. See WALTER F. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 38-59 (1979).
See also RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 42-134 (1989).
For a convenient overview of the various civil and criminal remedies available, see REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, para. 6.1-12.37. For a detailed and comprehensive argument
about similar failings in Ireland, many of which are analogous to England, see Eoin O'Dell,
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Without a law specifically directed at maintaining privacy, we will
continue to see scenarios like these played out over and over again in the
press: Princess Diana kissing Dodi Al Fayed on his private yacht3 or
exercising in her Isleworth gym; 32 the Duchess of York sunbathing topless
in the company of man not her husband;"3 Hugh Grant arguing with
Elizabeth Hurley in the garden of her West Country home.2' Should there
be no action for any of these intrusions? For many, the answer has been
no. One reason is that privacy intrusions often involve public figures who
are said to have given up all claims to privacy when they entered public
life. But this logic is faulty. First, it is far too broad an assumption.
While public figures indeed have a lesser expectation of privacy regarding
some matters, they are nonetheless entitled to retain a privacy interest in
matters outside the legitimate public concern. Surely, the sexual conduct
of an actor is of no legitimate concern to the public. Personal information
in that regard merely serves to satisfy public curiosity.' Second, this logic
fails to recognize that privacy is a fundamental right that, without more,
should not be held inapplicable to some people. Justice Brandeis rightfully
pointed out that privacy is integral to the pursuit of happiness:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feeling, and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred as against the
government, the right to be let alone - the most
When Two Tribes Go to War, reprinted in LAW AND THE MEDIA 181, 184-237 (Marie
McGonagle ed. 1997).
31. Andrew Culf, Diana: Tormentors Pay Their Respects But Counsel Against Assigning
Blame, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2399179.
32. Roy Greenslade, Checking the Code. Would the Proposed New Editors' Code have
Prevented Some of the Most Infamous Cases if Intrusion in Recent Years?, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2402984.
33. Frances Gibb, If MPs Do Not Create Privacy Law, Judges Will, TIMES (London),
Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9226436.
34. Culf, supra note 31.
35. I concede that in some cases the public interest in a public figure may outweigh the
right to privacy. Especially in matters implicating a public official's fitness for office, society's
right to know can trump a public official's right to privacy. However, in the examples under
consideration here, no such interest is implicated.
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. 6
Because privacy is so fundamental and so highly valued, an implied
contract that would completely disavow a person's right to it is
unconscionable.
Another reason privacy rights are too quickly denied is that the
seriousness of the intrusion is often mistakenly based on the value of the
information revealed. Even though, practically speaking, the issue
revolves around a photograph of someone kissing, exercising, sunbathing
or arguing, this is the revelation, not the intrusion. The intrusion is upon a
person's ability to control what kind and how much information about him
is revealed to others. Controlling the information known about us is the
way we as individuals define ourselves. It is also the way that each of us
remains able to redefine ourselves, free from the indefinite stigma
associated with permanent records which can, and often do, reappear to
haunt and undermine all our future endeavors. The intrusion, then, is upon
a person's dignity. It should not be minimized because, at first glance,
what seems to be at issue is merely a true record (photograph, videotape,
audio tape, etc.) about oneself made public.
Finally, because of present technology, these kinds of privacy
intrusions have spread so far as to include everyone, not just movie actors
whose interests tend to be minimized by courts, or public officials whose
otherwise private activities may implicate a genuine public interest. It is
no longer true that only limited numbers of people, namely the press,
control what information is disseminated to the public. Now, via the
Internet, virtually everyone has access to the media. It has been said that
the video Camera is the great equalizer which has democratiz[ed]
technology3 - that because of the new video vigilantism, the general
public is able to expose violations and effect changes in society more
efficiently than it ever has before.
I suggest that it is the Internet, not the video camera, which more
properly deserves to be called the great equalizer. Just like photographs
before the advent of the video camera, and sketches before the advent of
the camera, images captured through surreptitious video taping were only
made public when an editor decided they had commercial value. But now,
the Internet has provided the masses with unlimited free access to a
medium capable of instantaneously broadcasting private images to a global
36. EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 40 (1978) citing Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022.
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audience. The Internet has replaced the editor, who sometimes, though all
too infrequently, refused to publish information in poor taste or that was
violative of privacy rights. A prime example is the set of photographs that
were taken of Diana as she lay dying in that Paris tunnel. Editors all over
the world announced that they would not publish the photographs., In
spite of the self-restraint of editors, the photographs appeared on the
Internet. 9
There are numerous other paparazzi Internet sites available where
photographs of various celebrities can be viewed free of charge.4 Surely
pay-per-view Internet sites, such as those now widely available for viewing
other types of prurient material," are on the horizon. One particular
incident comes to mind. Many years ago, a photographer snapped a
photograph of the Queen just as a gust of wind blew her dress over her
head. 42 The photograph was never published, owing to a greater self-
restraint by the press than exists today.'3  The Internet provides a
marketplace for photographs like this despite editors' efforts to minimize
intrusions. There is no question that a photograph of the Queen in her
skivvies on a pay-per-view Internet site would be enormously profitable.
Because England fails to recognize a specific right to privacy, publication
by the press or a member of the public on the Internet would not be
actionable."
38. See Karen Lowe, Hollywood Joins Outcry Over Paparazzi Following Diana Death,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 1, 1997 available in 1997 WL 13386914.
39. Joan Smith, They'd Gawped For Years. Why Would They Stop Now?, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12347916.
40. See, for example <http://www.dkiproductions.com/madonnal.html> where
paparazzo Dave Kotinsky has posted exclusive photos of Madonna "caught leaving her
Manhattan apartment for a night on the town," among others.
41. One such pay per view site offers nude photographs for $29.95 for 30-day unlimited
access or $39.95 for ninety days, payable by credit card. See<http://www.netnudes.com.>
Another site, (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.barely18live.com. > charges $9.90 to view
especially young-looking models for ten minutes.
42. A member of the press, in an interview for Frontline, Princess and the Press, PBS,
broadcast on Nov. 18, 1997, told of how he photographed the incident as Queen Elizabeth was
boarding a plane. He delivered the photo to the Windsors for their disposal and they were never
published. A transcript of the interview is temporarily available on the internet at (visited Nov.
20, 1997) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/royals/interviews>.
43. Id.
44. In the United States, a similar photograph was held to be an invasion of the right to
privacy. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964), where a woman's
dress blew over her head while in a carnival Fun House. A photographer was there and snapped
the photo as part of a public scene at the carnival. It was subsequently published on the front
page of his newspaper. The case has been cited as one of those rare instances where a United
States court recognized a right to privacy in a public place. See McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022.
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Such Internet sites needn't be limited to the exploitation of
celebrity photographs. Private figures are also at risk. As evidenced by
programs like America's Funniest Home Videos, the public also has an
appetite for viewing private figures in a variety of embarrassing private
situations. The Internet provides another as yet unexploited market for
similar programs. The public could, for example, submit intrusive videos
to a public-made Internet video show modeled after "America's Funniest
Home Videos." Such submissions might include a male youth with a
spontaneous erection, a woman temporarily deprived of her swimsuit after
a dive into the ocean, or a couple making love in their back yard
swimming pool. As was the case with B, the sunbather discussed earlier,
these invasions would likewise go unprotected under England's current
system.
The Warren and Brandeis right to be let alone is far from trivial,
especially in light of modern technology. Without legally enforceable
privacy rights, the Internet has the potential to become "the greatest leveler
of human privacy ever known. "4 It implicates a human right necessary to
every person's dignity and pursuit of happiness. Unless England
recognizes a general and independent right of privacy, public and private
figures alike will be faced with the untenable choice of remaining prisoners
in their homes or sacrificing an important human right.
IV. PARLIAMENT'S REJECTION OF THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
Parliament has considered creating a statutory right of privacy on
numerous occasions over the past fifty years. 46 Unfortunately, all attempts
to statutorily create a right to privacy have failed. In 1969, a general right
to privacy bill was introduced in Parliament which not only addressed
intrusions by publication, but also addressed intrusions into seclusion
through "spying, prying, watching or besetting" and "unauthorized
overhearing or recording" of both spoken words and visual images. 47 The
Bill was withdrawn on the grounds that the right was not well enough
defined. It was feared that without a clearer definition, court discretion
45. McClurg, supra note 14, at 1022, quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756
(1971) (Justice Douglas, dissenting).
46. One of the early calls for Parliament to create a right of privacy occurred in 1938, in a
letter to the editor by a member of Parliament. See PRATr, supra note 30, at 82. For
information regarding a right to privacy bill introduced in the House of Lords in 1961, see
WACKS, supra note 30, at 40 n.38.
47. WACKS, supra note 30, at 40.
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would be too broad, and that citizens, who might interpret the right too
broadly, would flood the courts with unwarranted litigation. 48
In 1970, Parliament appointed a Committee on Privacy, chaired by
Kenneth Younger, to determine whether a right of privacy enforceable
against individuals and organizations was needed.49  The Younger
Committee conceded that privacy is "a basic need, essential to the
development and maintenance of a free society and of a mature and stable
individual personality." 50  However, it was reluctant to endorse the
creation of a general right to privacy, echoing Parliament's concerns that
the scope of a general right would be too uncertain. 51 The Committee
nevertheless recommended the statutory creation of both a new crime and a
new tort of unlawful surveillance.52 Though Parliament agreed with the
Committee regarding the importance of the right of privacy, it still refused
to provide even narrow protection against unwarranted surveillance.
In 1987, another right of privacy bill was before Parliament. That
Bill defined the right of privacy as:
[t]he right of any person to be protected from intrusion
upon himself, his home, his family, his relationships and
communications with others, his property and his business
affairs, including intrusion by: 1) spying, prying,
watching or besetting; 2) the unauthorized overhearing or
recording of spoken words; 3) the unauthorized making of
visual images . . ..
Like its 1969 predecessor, the 1987 bill would have created a general right
of privacy. Practically speaking, it would have made actionable invasions
of privacy which do not contain the incident of publication. Though the
bill was given a second reading and completed its Committee stages in the
House of Commons, it was not passed.
In the 1988-89 Parliamentary session, Parliament again rejected an
opportunity to create a right of privacy.5 This time, a bill was introduced
which would create a tort action and a right of reply against members of
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id., citing REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY (chairman: Kenneth Younger)
Cmnd. 5012, para. 113 (1972).
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 560-65.
53. Right of Privacy Bill 1987, reprinted as Appendix J in the REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 107.
54. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1406.
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the press, but only for "public use or public disclosure of private
information. 55 The 1989 bill was narrower than its predecessors because it
required publication or the intent to publish. The bill failed to address
invasions of privacy by physical intrusion. Despite this apparent
narrowing, competing concerns regarding press freedoms ultimately caused
the Bill to be defeated.
56
In response to the introduction of the 1987 and 1989 bills and
surrounding public concern about invasions of privacy by the press,
Parliament formed yet another committee. The Committee on Privacy and
Related Matters, chaired by Sir David Calcutt (Calcutt Committee), was
given the task of "consider[ing] what measures (whether legislative or
otherwise) are needed to give further protection to individual privacy from
the activities of the press and improve recourse against the press for the
individual citizen, . . . and to make recommendations." 57  The Calcutt
Committee concluded that there was no need for a privacy tort.58 As an
alternative to legislative protections, the Calcutt Committee recommended
that complaints regarding invasions of the press handle privacy themselves
through a self-regulatory agency created for that purpose. 59 Should this
self-regulatory agency fail, the Calcutt Committee recommended
Parliament create "a statutory system for handling complaints. "6
Self-regulation was no stranger to the press and had already been
deemed a failure when Calcutt's new self-regulating agency was formed.61
In 1953, the self-regulatory agency known as the Press Council had been
created to promote ethical journalistic practices. 62 Almost forty years
later, in response to the Calcutt Committee's recommendations, the Press
Complaints Commission (PCC) replaced the failed Press Council. Unlike
its predecessor, the majority of the PCC's sixteen members have no
connection with the press. But this is not to suggest that the fox is no
55. Protection of Privacy Bill 1989, reprinted as Appendix K in the REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 108. See also id.
56. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1406.
57. Taken from a statement published by the Press Complaints Commission, Origins of the
Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/origins.htm>.
58. REPORT OF THE COMMiTTEE, supra note 2, at x, 46. See also Krotoszynski, supra
note 16, at 1406.
59. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 65.
60. Id. at xi, 73. See also Press Complaints Commission, Scrutiny of Press Self-
Regulation, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.htm>.
61. See Press Complaints Commission, Origins of the Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pec.org.uk/about/default.htm >.
62. Id.
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longer watching the hen house. Currently, seven of the PCC's sixteen
members are highly esteemed officials of the publishing industry. 63 There
is also a great deal of political power among its members. The Right
Honorable Lord Wakeham is Chairman. 64 Other Public Members include
Lord Tordoff, who served in the House of Lords from 1988-94, and the
Right Reverend John Waine, Bishop of Chelmsford from 1986-96.6 The
requirement that the majority of the PCC members be selected from
outside the publishing industry and the addition of politically persuasive
Public Members has not made a difference in the PCC's effectiveness.
Parliament, by having delegated its responsibility to a private agency,
seems to be more concerned with creating an organization that appears to
be powerful and unbiased than with effectively protecting privacy rights.
In 1993, Sir David Calcutt, in his second report on press self-
regulation, recommended abolition of the PCC.6 Calcutt concluded, as
had his predecessors, that the PCC was "flawed in its procedures and not
sufficiently independent of the press." 67 Calcutt also recommended that the
government proceed with the introduction of new criminal offenses on
physical intrusion and that it create a statutory tort for infringement of
privacy." The government's response was disappointing. While it accepted
Calcutt's findings regarding the ineffectiveness of the PCC, the
government nevertheless urged, for the third time, a strengthening of the
procedures for self-regulation. 69 Again postponing its duty to provide a
right of privacy, Parliament merely "reaffirmed its commitment to
consider introducing new criminal offenses on physical intrusion and said
63. The seven members of the press currently on the Commission are Iris Burton, Editor
in Chief, Women's Realm and Woman's Weekly; Jim Cassidy, Editor, The Sporting Life; Tom
Clarke, Editor, The Sporting Life; Graham Collier, Editor, Surrey Advertiser; Sir David English,
Chairman and Editor in Chief, Associated Newspapers; John Griffith, Editor, Liverpool Echo;
John Witherow, Editor, The Sunday Times. The full list of Commission members is available at
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/members.htm >.
64. Lord Wakeham has enjoyed a distinguished political career, having served as Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords from 1992-94; Secretary of State for Energy from
1989-92; Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1988-89; Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 1987-88 and Government Chief Whip
from 1983-87. Id.
65. Id.
66. Taken from a statement by the Press Complaints Commission, Scrutiny of Press Self-
Regulation, (visited Nov. 3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.htm>.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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that it would give consideration to the merits of a new civil tort of
privacy."70
Two months after Sir David Calcutt's call for statutory protections,
the National Heritage Select Committee on Privacy and Media Intrusion
also urged the Government to protect privacy rights.7' In their March
1993 report, the Committee recommended the creation of a yet another
new self-regulatory agency that would be overseen by a statutorily created
Press Ombudsman. 72 Under their proposal, the Press Ombudsman would
be empowered by statute to impose large fines." This proposal is
interesting because it maintained the idea of self-regulation but, because it
gave government authority to an overseer, the agency's decisions would
have had the force of law. The Heritage Select Committee also
recommended a criminal offense for physical intrusion and a civil tort for
infringement of privacy be established.74 Parliament responded much as it
had before, by giving a lip service promise to consider the merits of the
Committee's recommendations. 5
In light of the utter failure of the PCC and its predecessor to
protect privacy through self-regulation, it is inconceivable that Parliament
could continue to delegate its duty to provide citizens effective remedies
for invasions of privacy to this ineffective private body. But that is exactly
what it did. Then came the tragedy of September 1997, when Princess
Diana was killed during a paparazzi motorcycle chase. Though Diana's
death occurred in Paris,76 and was further complicated by the intoxication
of her driver, the appalling newsgathering tactics which attended the
tragedy again brought the issue of invasions of privacy by the press to the
forefront. Earl Spencer, Diana's brother, who publicly proclaimed that
every newspaper editor who had ever published intrusive photographs of
70. Id.
71. Press Complaints Commission, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/scrutiny.Htm >.
72. Id.
73. Andrew Culf, The Death of Diana: Press Chances in on Privacy Media Watchdog's
Intervention Highlights Problems in Halting Harassment and Hounding, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2399175.
74. Press Complaints Commission, supra note 66.
75. Id.
76. Members of the press who are against the creation of a privacy law in England have
argued that since stringent French privacy laws failed to save Diana, privacy laws simply do not
work. See Anthony Bevins, Diana 1961-1997: The Tributes - Blood on Their Hands, Says
Brother,THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12343550.
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Diana had her blood on his hands, 77 appealed to Parliament for the creation
of a privacy law. But his appeal fell on deaf ears. Tony Blair, England's
Prime Minister, stated that he's "never been convinced about privacy
laws" 78, and his position that questions of privacy are best left to self-
regulation by the newspaper industry remains unshaken. 79 Astonishingly,
even in the wake of the Diana tragedy and the public support of privacy
laws which attended it, Parliament steadfastly maintained that privacy
issues were best resolved by the PCC.80
Unless Parliament creates a right of privacy, either by specific
legislation recognizing the right or by incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 81 the PCC will continue to be the sole
arbiter of invasions of privacy by the press. In light of that prospect, Lord
Wakeham has called for strong reform of the Commission's Code of
Practice. The current Code has very little to say about intrusion.82 While a
broad interpretation of the Code would prohibit a great many of the
77. Id.
78. Phillip Johnston, Earl Asks Blair for Privacy Law, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Sept. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2337288.
79. Bevins, supra note 76.
80. Earl Spencer had received 27,000 letters in support of his criticism of press
newsgathering tactics by the time he spoke with the Prime Minister urging privacy law reform.
See Johnston, supra note 78.
81. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Bill are discussed
herein at sections V and VI, respectively.
82. There are two articles from the Code which pertain to the right to be let alone and
intrusion into seclusion:
Article 4. Privacy. i) Intrusions and enquiries into an individual's private life without
his or her consent, including the use of long-lens photography to take pictures of
people on private property without their consent, are only acceptable when it can be
shown that these are, or are reasonably believed to be, in the public interest. ii)
Publication of material obtained under i) above is only justified when the facts show
that the public interest is served. Note - Private property is defined as i) any private
residence, together with its garden and outbuildings, but excluding any adjacent fields
or parkland and the surrounding parts of the property within the unaided view of
passers-by, ii) hotel bedrooms (but no other areas in a hotel) and iii) those parts of a
hospital or nursing home where patients are treated or accommodated. . . . Article 8.
Harassment. i) Journalists should neither obtain nor seek to obtain information or
pictures through intimidation or harassment. i) Unless their enquiries are in the public
interest, journalists should not photograph individuals on private property (as defined
in the note to Clause 4) without their consent; should not persist in telephoning or
questioning individuals after having been asked to desist; should not remain on their
property after having been asked to leave and should not follow them. iii) It is the
responsibility of editors to ensure that these requirements are carried out."
Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice, (visited Nov. 3, 1997)
< http://www.pcc.org.uk/complain/code .htm. >
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unsavory activities of the press, it appears to have been applied quite
narrowly. The PCC adjudicates very few violations involving public
figures and only one in eight complaints involves privacy. 83 When asked
why so few complaints of this nature were brought to the PCC, a
spokesman conceded that the difficulty in proving a breach of the Code
was a contributing factor. s4 Several of Lord Wakeham's proposed reforms
address some of the problems. For instance, Wakeham proposes to deal
with harassment by prohibiting the publication of photos obtained through
persistent pursuit, including those obtained by photographers "[w]ho stalk
their prey."85
Despite these reforms, the biggest problem with the resolution of
privacy violations through the PCC still remains. The PCC is a private
body with no authority to impose sanctions other than those agreed to by
its members. At present, the only available sanction is that the offending
publication print the Commission's findings "in full and with due
prominence."1' The PCC has been aptly described as a fraud because it
can impose no real sanctions and cannot compensate victims?' Even if
victim compensation were made available, some members of the press
would likely perceive fines of that sort as a necessary cost of doing
business. Fines would have to be quite sizeable to be an effective
deterrent, and it is unlikely that the PCC would agree to them if they
were." However, it must be conceded that even if effective economic
sanctions did exist, the PCC reaches only those editors willing to submit.
To date, not all members of the press submit to the PCC, and if legitimate
sanctions were to become a part of the ante, they likely never would.
83. Culf, supra note 73. For a compilation of complaints and adjudications, see The Press
Complaints Commission (visited Nov. 3, 1997) < http://www.pcc.org.uk/ajud.htm >.
84. E-mail from Tim Toulmin, Press Complaints Commission, to Laura Mall (Nov. 6,
1997) (on file with author).
85. Taken from a speech made by the Right Honorable Lord Wakehamn at a press
conference in Parliament Chamber, Crown Office Row, Temple on Sept. 25, 1997, (visited Nov.
3, 1997) <http://www.pcc.org.uk/adjud/pr250997.htm>.
86. Press Complaints Commission, Preamble to the Code of Practice, available at Press
Complaints Commission (visited Nov. 3, 1997) < http://www.pcc.org.uk/complain/code.htm >.
87. Allison Daniels, Guardian Debate: Press has Nothing to Fear from Privacy Law, QC
Argues ,THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14737744.
88. Apparently, the profits involved in checkbook journalism are quite staggering. For
example, THE MIRROR paid 250,000 pounds for the photograph of Diana and Dodi Al Fayed
kissing in St. Tropez. Culf, supra note 31.
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V. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF A COMMON LAW RIGHT To PRIVACY
The courts of England have done little for those in need of privacy
protection. British judges believe that the creation of a new right rests with
the legislature and, in light of Parliament's refusal to create one, have been
hesitant to act. The judiciary's refusal to recognize a right of privacy
where it does not legislatively exist was apparent in a case involving
British-comedy star Gordon Kaye. 9
In 1990, Mr. Kaye, star of the British comedy Allo, Allo, was in
the hospital recuperating from brain surgery when a photographer from
Sunday Sport violated the sanctity of his hospital room. 90 The journalist
asked him questions and took photographs without his permission (medical
evidence proved Mr. Kaye's condition was such that he was incapable of
giving informed consent)'91 Precisely because there is no privacy right in
England, nor any other effective alternative action, Mr. Kaye was unable
to prevent the printing of the photographs.Y Despite this complete lack for
a remedy, the court refused to create a common law right to privacy.
Court of Appeals judge Lord Justice Glidewell deferred to Parliament,
concluding that "[t]he facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of
the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what
circumstances statutory provision can be made to protect the privacy of
individuals."93 In a concurring opinion, Lord Justice Leggett echoed that
the right to privacy "has so long been disregarded here that it can be
recognized now only by the Legislature."'
Kaye is not the only example of the judiciary's deference to
Parliament regarding the right to privacy. Malone v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner also demonstrates the judiciary's reluctance to step on the
toes of Parliament:
No new right in the law, fully-fledged with all appropriate
safeguards, can spring from the head of a judge deciding a
particular case: only Parliament can create such a right...
One of the factors that must be relevant in such a case is
the degree of particularity in the right that is claimed. The
89. Kaye v. Andrew Robertson and Sport Newspapers Ltd., 1990, appended to REPORT
OF THE COMMITrEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, supra note 2, at 98.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 99.
92. Four alternative rights of action were pursued but failed. These were libel, malicious
falsehood, trespass to the person, and passing off. Id. at 100.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 104.
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wider and more indefinite the right claimed, the greater the
undesirability of holding that such a right exists. 9
Malone has been cited as having essentially foreclosed any future attempts
at a judicial creation of a common law right to privacy.96 But I disagree.
While a broad and general right of privacy may not spring from the head
of a judge, other language in the decision suggests that more limited
equitable remedies for specific invasions of privacy may still be available
under the common law. The Court limits its decision to the tapping of
telephone lines in which the police have just cause or excuse, stating it
"decide[s] nothing on tapping elected for other purposes, or by other
persons, or by other means."' The Malone case, then, has not necessarily
foreclosed all common law creation of a right to privacy.
Malone is significant for another reason. The Malone judiciary
rebuffed arguments that a right to privacy had been created in England by
the European Convention on Human Rights. As regards the European
Convention, the Court noted that:
The United Kingdom, as a High Contracting Party that
ratified the Convention on March 8, 1951, has thus long
been under an obligation to secure these rights and
freedoms to everyone. That obligation, however, is an
obligation under a treaty which is not justiciable in the
courts of this country. Whether that obligation has been
carried out is not for me to say ... All that I do is to hold
that the Convention does not, as a matter of English law,
confer any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can enforce
in English courts."
The Malone Court correctly recognized that it was the obligation of the
State, as a High Contracting Party, and not the province of the courts, to
implement legislation which would give effect to the Convention. Since
Parliament had neither created a statutory right to privacy, nor passed
legislation giving effect to the European Convention on Human Rights, the
Court ultimately concluded that it could "find nothing in the authorities or
contentions . . . to support the plaintiffs claim based on the right of
95. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 1412, citing Malone, wherein the Malone case is cited
as having foreclosed the creation of a common law right to privacy.
96. Id.
97. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, 67 I.L.R. 345 (1979).
98. Id. at 339-40.
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privacy. "9 Malone appealed the decision directly to the European
Commission of Human Rights.' °° It was Malone's hope that a right to
privacy would be found to exist under international law. If so, the United
Kingdom, in violation of its treaty obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights, would be required to provide a remedy. I
turn now to a discussion of privacy as addressed by the European
Convention on Human Rights.
VI. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention), to which the United Kingdom has been a signatory since
1951, provides that "[Elveryone shall have the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. "1' As this is
written quite broadly (just as most human rights documents are), it is
uncertain from its face whether the right would encompass invasions of
privacy by the media. Though the European Court of Human Rights has
considered over sixty cases in which Article 8 was at issue,' °0 none has
squarely put before it the question of an individual's right to be let alone
versus the media's right to gather news. Notwithstanding the inherent
difficulties in balancing of the right to privacy against freedom of the
press, there are two additional obstacles that must be overcome if the
European Convention is to provide the protection England lacks.
The first regards whether the Convention would apply to the press
as a private actor at all. Traditionally, international law applies only to
government action. The government has pledged that it will not violate, by
its own actions, the rights named within the treaty. But the Convention has
99. Id. at 336.
100 In order for a case to be accepted by the European Commission of Human Rights, and
ultimately referred to the European Court of Human Rights, Article 26 of the Convention
requires that an individual must first have exhausted all domestic remedies available. Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. Without a cause of action in England
for invasions of privacy, no further remedy was available, Malone was found to have exhausted
all available remedies and his individual petition was accepted then referred to the Court.
Ultimately, the Court found a violation of Article 8's guarantee of a right to privacy, but it was
only because the United Kingdom had failed to provide adequate safeguards against the abuse of
wire-tapping by the police. There was no finding that the United Kingdom was in derogation
because it lacks a privacy law. Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36-37
(1984).
101. ECHR, supra note 100.
102. For a convenient listing of European Court of Human Rights cases, see the
Department of International Law at the University of Salzburg where Christian Campbell
maintains a list of cases according to Convention article available in (visited Nov. 10, 1997)
<http://www.sbg.acat/var/ docs/egmr/ echrhome.htm>. http://www.sbg.ac.at/
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imposed upon States the positive obligation to uphold the rights embodied
in the Convention.' 3 This means that a State can violate the terms of the
treaty for doing nothing. By failing to provide redress to its citizens for
rights violations by private actors, for example, a State fails to uphold its
positive obligations under the treaty. The European Court of Human
Rights has specifically held that a State is under a positive obligation under
Article 8 to respect family life.'0 ' While it seems likely, it is nevertheless
uncertain whether the Court in Strasbourg would extend positive
obligations on a State to curb privacy intrusions by the media.
The second obstacle is whether the right to privacy as framed in
Article 8 can be understood to include a general right to be let alone, one
that is broad enough to encompass intrusion into seclusion, and the
publication of private facts. If the application of Article 8 turns solely on
the original intent of the Convention's framers and on the definition of the
right as historically interpreted by the members of the European Union,
protection against intrusion and publication of private facts is likely to be
found lacking. It must be remembered that the original purpose of the
Convention was to combat totalitarian governments in the wake of World
War II. Article 8 was framed in response to the invasions of homes by
Nazi troops, not intrusions into private affairs by the news media.'1'
Furthermore, European union member states have not traditionally granted
a broad right of privacy. As we have already seen, Parliament has
consistently refused to create any general right to be let alone. France,
often cited as the European nation with the most stringent privacy laws, did
not develop a common law right to privacy until the 1960's, and they did
not codify the right until 1970.106 The most substantial protections for this
aspect of privacy, then, did not exist in Europe until more than twenty-five
years after the Convention was put into effect. While other privacy rights
unrelated to Article 8's original purpose have fallen within its scope, a
common understanding among the High Contracting Parties is still often
103. Article 13 states that "[elveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
Krotoszynski, supra note 56. See also Campbell & Cosons v. UK, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 17
(1982), where the Court defines the word respect used in Article 2 of the Convention to imply
that a State is under a positive obligation to act. Article 8 uses the word respect when defining
State obligations regarding the right to privacy. ECHR, supra note 100, art. 8.
104. See Gaskin, 160 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. (ser. A.) at 15, 17-20 (1989) where the Court
held that the Government violated its positive obligations under Article 8 by failing to provide a
system whereby Gaskin could retrieve a Government file relating to his care when he was a ward
of the State.
105. PRATT, supra note 30, at 86-87.
106. REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE, supra note 2, at 14.
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necessary. For example, the Court held that a United Kingdom law
criminalizing homosexual conduct to be a violation of a homosexual's right
to respect for his privacy and family life in part because of the modem day
acceptance for this kind of lifestyle among other Member States, even if
not in Ireland.'° If there is no common European understanding that the
Article 8 right to privacy encompasses even a minimum of protection for
the kinds of invasions at issue here, and I submit that there is none, any
claim to the right under the Convention may fail.
Only when an applicant has overcome both the obstacles discussed
above will the issue turn on a balancing of the interests between an
individual's right to privacy and society's right to know. Of course, the
right to know is part of the guarantee of freedom of expression as
embodied in Article 10 of the European Convention. I turn now to a
discussion of that competing interest.
A. Freedom of Expression under the European Convention on
Human Rights
The right to privacy cannot be considered alone. It must be
considered in tandem with the competing right of freedom of expression.
Article 10 of the European Convention protects freedom of expression,
including the right to receive and impart information without government
interference. ' 3 There is no question that freedom of the press is necessary
to a democratic society, and I can add nothing to the debate that has
already clearly established its high value. But, freedom of speech and of
the press has never been regarded as absolute. Freedom of the press should
not, and need not, be maintained at the expense of other important rights.
Article 10 recognizes the necessity for limits to be placed on freedom of
expression and of the press:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be. subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society . . . for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.' °0
107. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1981).
108. ECHR, supra note 100.
109. Id. art.10, § 2.
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Thus, Article 10 expressly recognizes boundaries regarding the publication
of information in breach of confidence and which are libelous. But the
phrase that refers to the rights of others indicates that this list is not meant
to be exhaustive. 'o While these rights might refer narrowly to the specific
human rights as enumerated in Article I of the Convention, the preceding
phrase, as are prescribed by law suggests an even broader reference. The
rights of others is more likely meant to include domestically created rights
as well as international human rights. Either way, the language of Article
10 leaves the door open for a privacy limitation on freedom of expression
to be recognized.
The Strasbourg Court has yet to deal with any case that pits the
rights of a free press against the privacy rights of an individual. However,
the Court has dealt with privacy and free press issues separately. If
anything may be gleaned from an overview of the two bodies of case law,
it is that the right of a free press is broad and well defined, and the right to
privacy is less so. This does not bode well for advocates of the right to
privacy.
Though the Strasbourg Court has not yet dealt with any case
concerning the intrusion of the media into the privacy of an individual,
such as was the issue in Kaye,"' the Court has dealt with cases that are
somewhat analogous. One such case involved the libelous publication of
five articles about the private lives of certain Antwerp Magistrates."12 The
articles severely criticized the Magistrates for having granted child custody
to a father accused of sexually abusing the children, and concluded that the
Magistrates based their decision on bias, cronyism and in misplaced right-
wing politics. The judgement of the domestic courts against the newspaper
were based on violations of domestic law which prohibits publication of
"ill-considered accusations without sufficient evidence;" that "employs
gratuitously offensive terms or exaggerated expression;" or that "fails to
respect private life or the individual's privacy."'"3 According to the
Brussels tribunal, the journalists were liable for defamation for having
"besmirched the honor of the magistrates without being in possession of all
110. Id.
111. Ben Emmerson, Newspapers Fear that Incorporating the European Convention on
Human Rights into UK Law will Restrict Investigative Reporting, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Nov. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14739002.
112. Haes & Gijsels v. Belgium, (7/19961626/809) Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) publication
pending, but currently available at the European Court of Human Rights (visited Nov. 5, 1997)
< http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/DEHAES.html >.
113. Id. para. 26.
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the necessary information. "1" The courts also held that in doing so, the
newspaper had invaded the privacy of the Magistrates:
In the instant case the appellants dared to go one step
further by maintaining, without a shred of evidence, that
they were entitled to infer the alleged bias from the very
personalities of the judges and the Advocate-General and
thus interfere with private life, which is without any doubt
unlawful. 1-
The European Court disagreed. It held that the government had not
violated Article 8.116 First, the Court noted that the applicants had not
"cast doubt on the information published regarding the fate of the X
children. "1" That being the case, the inferences which the newspaper drew
from their correct knowledge of the record of the case were value
judgments, which the Court held distinguishable from facts. '  Also
important to the Court's judgment was the idea that the issue at hand,
regarding the impartiality of the judiciary, was of such significant public
interest that the government was unjustified in its interference with
freedom of expression.19
There was one notable exception. The Court found that the
journalists had invaded the privacy of the Magistrates for making reference
to the activities of the family of one of the magistrates:
One of the allusions to the alleged political sympathies was
inadmissible - the one concerning the past history of the
father of one of the judges criticized . . . It is unacceptable
that someone should be exposed to opprobrium because of
matters concerning a member of his family. A penalty was
justifiable on account of that allusion by itself.
It was, however, only one of the elements in this case.
The applicants were convicted for the totality of the
114. Id. para. 27.
115. Id. para. 41.
116. Id. para. 49.
117. Haes & Gijsels v. Belgium, (71199616261809) Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 40 (1997).
118. Id. para. 42.
119. Id. para. 37.
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accusations of bias they made against the three judges and
the Advocate-General in question.'"
It is interesting that the Court found conclusions drawn from true facts
regarding a public official's family violated Article 8 when similar
conclusions drawn from other true facts did not. Was it the publication of
private information about the family, or the "allusion" that the apple had
not fallen far from the tree that the Court held objectionable? The
distinction is critical. Action for the first is an invasion of privacy for
publication of true embarrassing facts, while the other is for defamation.
Each implicates Article 10's right to free speech, but only the former
would implicate Article 8. It appears, by the use of the word "allusions"
and "opprobrium" that what the Court found actionable was defamation,
not invasion of privacy. Regretfully, the Court failed to make the
distinction clear.
Notwithstanding that one small concession, the Court appears to be
highly deferential to Article 10. Most notably, the Court virtually
disregarded two arguments put forth by the government: first, that the
Magistrates are different from most public officials, because owing to
ethical constraints which prevent them from commenting about cases, they
cannot respond to criticism about their decisions; and second, that the
government's interest in preserving the public confidence in its judiciary
justifies its protection against unfounded attacks. 121 This second
justification appears to be specifically allowed under Article 10 to maintain
"the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."'22  While the Court is
often generous in providing a wide margin of appreciation to the
government for its determination of what is "necessary in a democratic
society . . . for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others,' 23 it is apparently less
willing to do so when freedom of expression is implicated.
Another case involved a libel action over a book published about
the private life of the applicant. ' The United Kingdom provided a remedy
for information published that was false, but offered no remedy where the
120. Id. para. 45. The newspaper had made reference to the fact that the father of one of
the judges was "a big-wig in the gendarmerie who was convicted in 1948 of collaboration: he
had, in close collaboration with the 'Feldgendarmerie', restructured the Belgian gendarmerie
along Nazi lines. [YB] is no less controversial as a magistrat." Id. para. 19.
121. Id. para. 14.
122. ECHR, supra note 100.
123. 1d.
124. Emmerson, supra note 111.
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information published was true.' The applicant claimed that true
information published about his private life was an invasion of his
privacy. 126 The European Commission on Human Rights held that the
remedies provided by the United Kingdom under defamation and breach of
confidence were sufficient, and so the United Kingdom was not held to
have violated Article 8. '2 This suggests that the Commission is unwilling
to find a State in violation of its positive obligations when it offers some,
even if insufficient, remedy. From this we might infer that where the State
offers no remedy at all, as was illustrated in Kaye, the Commission would
hold a State in violation. This precise question, whether other remedies
such as trespass, defamation, and breach of confidence, or even those
offered by the quasi-public PCC, are sufficient in their incidental
protection of privacy, is precisely the one that Parliament has been faced
with for quite some time. Parliament's response has been that those
remedies do adequately protect privacy rights, even though cases like Kaye
clearly belie that proposition. The Strasbourg Court may offer a wide
margin of appreciation to the United Kingdom for their view that incidental
protections to the right of privacy are enough. If they do, future holdings
of the Strasbourg Court may closely resemble the deferential treatment
English judges have paid to Parliament.
B. Potential Effect of a Violation of the European Convention
Article 1 of the Convention confers upon its signatories the
obligation to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I.",u Further, Article 53 obligates contracting
parties to "abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.' 29 Should a violation be found, the Court would issue a judgment
so stating, and award a specific remedy, such as damages and costs, to the
injured party.,". While the judgment of the Court does require that the
State come into compliance with its Convention obligations, the Court is
not empowered to dictate exactly how it should do so. The Court has
confirmed that "the Contracting States remain free to choose the measures
which they consider appropriate."13 '
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ECHR, supra note 100.
129. Id.
130. Damages are permitted under Article 50. Id.
131. The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1979).
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In any case involving a State's positive obligations, there are
difficulties regarding compliance that do not necessarily occur in negative
obligation cases. In the latter, a State is directed to discontinue a specific
practice. Assuming full compliance, the practical result for citizens is that
the practice will no longer occur. In the former, there is the potential that
a State will enact measures that only partially or otherwise unsatisfactorily
protect the citizen against future violations. This is especially likely, as
here, when the State has demonstrated reluctance to provide the
protections. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that exceptions to
freedom of expression must be narrowly interpreted. In the Thalidomide
Case, the United Kingdom had issued an injunction against the publication
of an article regarding the negligence of a company that manufactured and
marketed a drug to pregnant women that subsequently caused severe birth
defects. 32 Civil cases against the company were at various stages of action
and the government's injunction was intended to prevent trial by
newspaper.", An Article 10 violation was found despite the express
provision allowing exceptions for "maintaining . . . impartiality of the
judiciary." The injunction was held to be an unnecessary infringement on
freedom of expression under the specific facts of the case.1"4 The
Thalidomide Case, then, demonstrates how the Court might be inclined to
apply narrowly any restrictions placed on freedom of expression.
So, given a State's freedom to prescribe for itself how it chooses to
comply with a violation of the European Convention, Parliament's
potential reluctance to implement broad privacy measures, and the Court's
instruction that restrictions on freedom of expression should be narrowly
applied, a violation of Article 8 may do little to impact privacy rights in
England. Despite this pessimism, incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law may still provide for a
general right of privacy.
VII. THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL
Although the United Kingdom played a major part in drafting the
Convention and was the first to ratify it in 1951, it has never incorporated
the Convention into domestic law.1 5 As we have already seen, the result is
that British citizens cannot enforce Article 8's privacy right's in British
courts. Instead, they must appeal to the European Commission of Human
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 42.
135. Rachael Donnelly, Labour Unveils Bill to Improve Protection of Basic Human Rights,
THE IRISH TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12032014.
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Rights who may, if the case meets certain criteria, refer the case to the
European Court of Human Rights."' On average, the process takes
approximately five years to complete and will cost the petitioner
approximately thirty thousand pounds. 3 ' Practically speaking, such a
costly and time-consuming process does not afford an effective remedy to
the majority of British citizens. The better solution would be for the
United Kingdom to finally incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law. And this is exactly what is being considered.
On October 24, 1997, the British Government published a White
Paper announcing the Government's intention to bring UK law in line with
the European Convention on Human Rights.'38 If passed, the Human
Rights Bill now pending before Parliament would incorporate the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. This would enable
British citizens to enforce a right of privacy in domestic courts, making it
unnecessary for Parliament to create a general right of privacy or enact
specific privacy tort legislation.
While this seems like an ideal solution, whether any meaningful
right to privacy will emerge will ultimately depend on how it is balanced
against the rights of a free press. Lord Bingham, Britain's highest-ranking
judge, pointed out that "what is going to have to be confronted is the
demarcation of the boundary between privacy and free speech. I think this
is difficult and debatable territory. In deciding whether publication would
infringe the right of privacy, the obvious criterion for judges to use would
be 'public interest'."'39 The problem with using a public interest criterion
is that the term is subject to differing interpretations. The press, on the
one hand, would argue for the narrowest possible definition. To them,
anything that sells newspapers might be considered to be in the public
interest. In the words of Sir John Donaldson, the press is "peculiarly
vulnerable to the error of confusing public interest with their own
136. The Commission acts as a screening body to individuals, who may not directly appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights. The Commission determines whether a case should go
before the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR, supra note 100, art. 25-27.
137. Alan Travis, Judges Win Power in Historic Bill - Courts to Rule on Privacy, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 25, 1997 available in 1997 WL 14737335. See also Donald
McIntyre, Can We Trust the Judges to Make Our Laws?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 19,
1997, available in 1997 WL 12347212.
138. The Human Rights Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on Oct. 23, 1997. The
text of the Bill, as yet unavailable through Her Majesty's Stationery Shop, is available at
Parliament's Internet web-site (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ ldbills/038/97038-a.htm>.
139. Clare Dyer, Courts May Rule on Privacy Rights - Judge Says New Law Unnecessary,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14734021.
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interest." '4 It is unlikely, however, that the term is susceptible to a
definition that would include information that merely serves to satisfy
public curiosity. The distinction between what satisfies prurient curiosity
and what is in the public interest most often arises in the context of a
public official. Those in favor of a broad interpretation would argue that
the morals of a public official, as evidenced by his sex life and other
private activity, directly relates to his fitness for public office. Those in
favor of a narrower interpretation, however, would argue that only when
there is a more direct interference with an official's ability to properly
carry out his duties is private information in the public interest. Eric
Barendt, Goodman Professor of Media Law at University College in
London, put it this way:
Even public figures are entitled to privacy. There is no
public interest justification for publishing details of a
politician's sex life, unless that interferes with the
discharge of his duties. The argument that the public has a
right to know the truth about every aspect of his private
life is particularly shabby. Taken seriously, this claim
would empty the privacy right of all content."",
While it remains to be seen how the courts will answer the
question of what is in the public interest, any definition narrower than that
which has been employed by the press will be a great victory for advocates
of privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The video camera, the telephoto lens and the Internet are just a few
of the advances that necessitate a broader reading of the right of privacy in
England and the international human rights community. Lord Wakeham
recognized that there is little one country can do to solve the problems
created by paparazzi operating in a global market. 42 But while Lord
Wakeham may be congratulated for making a heroic attempt to make a
difference within the narrow scope of his authority, Parliament cannot. By
deferring protection of the right of privacy to the PCC, Parliament failed to
provide its citizenry effective redress for privacy violations by the press.
Even if the PCC, under its revised Code, is successful in blocking the sale
of ill-gotten paparazzo photographs, the day is gone when the press are the
140. REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, supra note 2, at
para. 3.20.
141. Barendt, supra note 15.
142. Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lord Wakeham, supra note 85.
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singular masters of mass media. Any boycott the PCC calls regarding
photographs of a particular incident will only serve to stimulate market
demand. Because this may in fact prove to be even more profitable for the
paparazzi and individual violators, it could have the adverse effect of
increasing privacy violations.
It will be up to the judiciary to create a right to privacy in
England. Last year, Lord Bingham, the British equivalent to the United
States Supreme Court's Chief Justice, was said to have forewarned
Parliament that if it failed to protect personal privacy, "the judges
would." 143 It appears that Lord Bingham will soon have the opportunity to
realize his threat. The seemingly inevitable incorporation of the European
Convention of Human Rights into UK law' 44 will place the future of the
right to privacy, not in the hands of the European Court of Human Rights,
but in the hands of the English judiciary. Because Article 8's right to
privacy as it relates to intrusions by the press has not been well defined by
the Court in Strasbourg, it will remain necessary for British judges to
determine its scope. The title and content of the White Paper itself makes
this suggestion. "Rights Brought Home points out [that] British judges will
have more, not less, impact on European Human Rights jurisprudence. "145
Lord Bingham's remark also suggests that British judges, after
years of frustration over the lack of authority to provide just remedies, are
quite eager to protect privacy rights. It also appears likely that public
sentiment since the death of Diana has provided yet another impetus to act.
Continued denial of the right now, perhaps more than ever before, may
serve to seriously undermine public confidence in the judiciary. So,
despite their prior track record, British judges may well create a broader
right than would have been defined by the European Court of Human
Rights in the full course of time -- given the Court's limitation to define the
right according to a common understanding within the European
Community.
Prior to the drafting of the Human Rights Bill, it was the hope of
privacy rights advocates that the Strasbourg Court would provide English
citizens the privacy protection they lacked. Ironically, it now appears that
143. Robert Rice, Top Judge Says Privacy Law Will Not be Needed, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Oct. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14785012.
144. Most commentators note little opposition to the Human Rights Bill. I have found only
one reference in the U.K. press which suggests that the Tories may be unhappy with the Bill.
Michael Streeter, Human Rights: Bill Leaves Unanswered Questions, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15213387.
145. A Milestone for Human Rights - But Keep Judges from Privacy, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Oct. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14737350.
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England, heretofore one of the few countries in the European Union with
no right of privacy at all, may assist the Court in Strasbourg to define the
right more broadly. Long overdue, the right to privacy is finally ripe for
broad recognition in England and in Europe.
